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Abstract
We present an efficient technique, which allows to train classification networks
which are verifiably robust against norm-bounded adversarial attacks. This frame-
work is built upon the work of Gowal et al., who applies the interval arithmetic to
bound the activations at each layer and keeps the prediction invariant to the input
perturbation. While that method is faster than competitive approaches, it requires
careful tuning of hyper-parameters and a large number of epochs to converge. To
speed up and stabilize training, we supply the cost function with an additional
term, which encourages the model to keep the interval bounds at hidden layers
small. Experimental results demonstrate that we can achieve comparable (or even
better) results using a smaller number of training iterations, in a more stable fashion.
Moreover, the proposed model is not so sensitive to the exact specification of the
training process, which makes it easier to use by practitioners.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models achieve impressive performance in computer vision Krizhevsky et al. [2012],
natural language processing Hinton et al. [2012], and many other domains. Although neural networks
are able to outperform humans on various machine learning tasks, they are also vulnerable to
adversarial examples Szegedy et al. [2013]. In particular, a slightly modified input can fool the neural
model and change its prediction. This is a serious problem, which limits the use of NNs in many
areas, such as autonomous cars Sitawarin et al. [2018] or malware detection Grosse et al. [2017],
where security is a priority. In recent years, a lot of effort has been put on understanding deep learning
models and making them more robust Salman et al. [2019], Mirman et al. [2019].
Adversarial attacks rely on creating such input data points, which are visually indistinguishable
from ‘normal’ examples, but drastically change the prediction of the model Goodfellow et al. [2014].
One remedy is to construct adversarial examples and add them to the training set Madry et al.
[2017]. While such models become robust to many adversarial attacks, there are no guarantees that
another adversarial scheme exists. To formally verify the robustness of the model against norm-
bounded perturbations, one can find the outer bound on the so-called ‘adversarial polytope’ Wong
and Kolter [2017]. These techniques give loose bounds on the output activations, but guarantee that
no adversary within a given norm can change the class label. Unfortunately, most of these techniques
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Figure 1: The wrapping effect. A datapoint (black dot) with its initial adversarial polytope (blue
square) is transformed by rotation by 45 degrees. After every transformation a new adversarial
polytope is formed (outer green square),
√
2 bigger than the previous one.
are computationally demanding and do not scale well to large networks, which makes them difficult
to use in practice.
In this paper, we consider the framework of interval bounds propagation (IBP) proposed by Gowal et
al. Gowal et al. [2018] for constructing provably robust classifiers. IBP uses the interval arithmetic
to minimize the upper bound on the maximum difference between any pair of logits when the input
is perturbed within the norm-bounded ball. Direct application of interval arithmetic in a layer-wise
fashion leads to the well-known wrapping effect Moore [1979], because bounds are reshaped to be
axis-aligned with bounding boxes that always encompass the adversarial polytope, see Figure 1. To
overcome this limitation, the authors starts from a typical classification loss to pretrain the network
and gradually increases the importance of adversarial loss together with increasing the size of the
input perturbation. Unfortunately, too sudden change of these trade-off factors results in the lack of
convergence, which makes the training process cumbersome and time consuming.
In this contribution, we show that the training procedure of IBP can be significantly simplified, which
results in more stable training and faster convergence. Our key idea relies on combining the IBP loss
with an additional term, which controls the size of adversarial polytope across layers. More precisely,
we minimize the size of outer bound of adversarial polytope at each layer jointly with the IBP cost
function, see Figure 2 for the illustration. As a result, our model is less sensitive to the change of the
aforementioned IBP hyper-parameters, which makes it easier to use in practice.
Our contribution is the following:
1. We introduce a new term to the IBP loss function. Our modification allows to use larger
perturbations at the initial stage of training and helps to stabilize the training. Moreover, it
requires a lower number of epochs to obtain comparable performance to IBP. In consequence,
our model can be seen as a very efficient technique for constructing provable robust models,
which can be applied to large networks. The proposed idea is not limited to IBP and can
be incorporated in other robust training methods, such as the convex-optimization-based
approaches Wong and Kolter [2017], Dvijotham et al. [2018b]. It also helps to reduce
hyperparameter tuning (particularly dynamics of  during the training).
2. We give an insight on instability of IBP and show that this effect is correlated with a lack of
minimization of interval bounds in hidden layers. Looking from a different perspective —
we observe that IBP (implicitly) minimizes the interval bounds in hidden layers when the
training is convergent.
3. Conducted experiments support the research hypothesis, that the additional term in the loss
function stabilizes the training, improves its efficiency and guides the network in the early
stage of training. In the most challenging settings for the CIFAR-10, we are able to get
better results (verified test error) even using much smaller network than the one used in the
IBP’s best performance. We show concrete examples, where IBP fails (or gets stuck in local
minimum for a long time), whereas the new loss function allows to train the model in a
stable fashion.
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Figure 2: The scheme of the proposed method. The original IBP loss is supplied with an additional
term controlling the errors across layers.
2 Related work
The study on adversarial examples has begun from Szegedy et al. [2013], in which the authors noticed
that neural networks are fragile to targeted perturbations. Since then, numerous attacks and defenses
have followed Papernot et al. [2016], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017], Xiao et al. [2018a], Kurakin
et al. [2016], Tramer et al. [2017], Yuan et al. [2019]. One extremely effective way to defend against
adversarial examples is to generate such examples in the training stage Madry et al. [2017]. In this
approach, we try to mimic the adversary and simulate his behaviour. While this strategy provides
practical benefits, one cannot guarantee that other attacks does not exist.
To construct provable defenses, we aim to produce certificates that no perturbation within a fixed
norm can change a given class label. There is a number of works using exact solvers to verify the
robustness against adversarial attacks. These methods employ either integer programming approaches
Lomuscio and Maganti [2017], Tjeng et al. [2018], Dutta et al. [2018], Xiao et al. [2018b], Cheng
et al. [2017], or Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers Katz et al. [2017], Carlini et al. [2017],
Ehlers [2017]. A downside of these methods is their high computational complexity due to the
NP-completeness of the problem. In consequence, vast majority of these methods do not scale well
to large or even medium size networks.
To speed up the training of verifiably robust models, one can bound a set of activations reachable
through a norm-bounded perturbation Salman et al. [2019], Liu et al. [2019]. In Wong and Kolter
[2017], linear programming was used to find the convex outer bound for ReLU networks. This
approach was later extended to general non-ReLU neurons Zhang et al. [2018]. As an alternative,
Mirman et al. [2018], Singh et al. [2018a, 2019] adapted the framework of ‘abstract transformers’ to
compute an approximation to the adversarial polytope using the SGD training. This allowed to train
the networks on entire regions of the input space at once. Interval bound propagation Gowal et al.
[2018] applied the interval arithmetic to propagate axis-aligned bounding box from layer to layer.
Analogical idea was used in Dvijotham et al. [2018a], in which the predictor and the verifier networks
were trained simultaneously. While these methods are computationally appealing, they require careful
tuning of hyper-parameters to provide tight bounds on the verification network. Finally, there are also
hybrid methods, which combine exact and relaxed verifiers Bunel et al. [2018], Singh et al. [2018b].
3 Interval bound propagation
In this section we first give the main idea behind training provable robust models. Next, we recall
the IBP framework based on the interval arithmetic. Finally, we present our model, which is the
extension of the IBP approach.
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3.1 Training robust classifiers
We consider a feed-forward neural network f : RD → RN designed for a classification task. The
network is composed of K layers given by K transformations:
zk = hk(zk−1), for k = 1, . . . ,K.
In practice, hk is either an affine transformation or nonlinear monotonic function such as ReLU or
Sigmoid. In the training stage, we feed the network with pairs of input vector z0 = x and its correct
class label ytrue and minimize the cross-entropy with softmax applied to the output logits zK .
In the adversarial attack, any test vector x can be perturbed by some ∆ with l∞ norm-bounded by ,
for a small fixed  > 0. Thus the input to the network can by any point in D-dimensional hyper-cube:
I(x) = I(x− , x+ ) = [x1 − , x1 + ]× . . .× [xD − , xD + ].
centered at x with side length 2. This set is transformed by a neural network f into some convex set
called adversarial polytope:
Z(x) = {f(z) : z ∈ I(x)}.
To design provable defense against adversarial attack, we have to ensure that class label ytrue does
not change for any output zK ∈ Z(x). In other words, all inputs from the hyper-cube I(x) should
be labeled as ytrue by a neural network f . In this context, a fraction of incorrectly classified examples
on the test set is called the verified test error.
3.2 Verifiable robustness using IBP
Exact verification of the model robustness may be difficult even for simple neural networks. Thus
we usually look for an easier task computing loose outer bound of Z(x) and control the class label
inside this bound. In the IBP approach Gowal et al. [2018], we find the smallest bounding box at
each layer that encloses the transformed bounding box from the previous layer. In other words, we
bound the activation zk of each layer by an axis-aligned bounding box
I(zk, zk) = [zk,1, zk,1]× . . .× [zk,Dk , zk,Dk ].
In the case of neural networks, finding such a bounding box from layer to layer fashion can be
computed efficiently using the interval arithmetic. By applying the affine layer
hk(zk−1) = Wkzk−1 + bk
to I(zk−1, zk−1), the smallest bounding box I(zk, zk) for output zk is given by
µk−1 =
zk−1+zk−1
2 ,
rk−1 =
zk−1−zk−1
2 ,
µk = Wkµk−1 + bk−1
rk = |Wk|rk−1
zk = µk − rk,
zk = µk + rk,
where | · | is an element-wise absolute value operator. For a monotonic activity function hk, we get
the interval bound defined by:
zk = h(zk−1),
zk = h(zk−1).
To obtain a provable robustness in the classification context, we consider the worst-case prediction
for the whole interval bound I(zK , zK) of the final logits. More precisely, we need to ensure that the
whole bounding box is classified correctly, i.e. no perturbation changes the correct class label. In
consequence, the logit of the true class is equal to its lower bound and the other logits are equal to
their upper bounds:
zˆK,y() =
{
zK,y, for y 6= ytrue,
zK,ytrue , otherwise .
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Finally, one can apply softmax with the cross-entropy loss to the logit vectors zˆK() representing the
worst-case prediction.
As shown in Gowal et al. [2018], computing interval bounds uses only two forward passes through
the neural network, which makes this approach appealing from a practical perspective. Nevertheless,
a direct application of the above procedure with a fixed  may fail because propagated bounds are
too loose especially for very deep networks (see also wrapping effect illustrated in Figure 1) . To
overcome this problem Gowal et al. supplied the above interval loss with a typical cross-entropy cost
applied to original non-interval data:
IBP = κ`(zK , ytrue) + (1− κ)`(zˆk(), ytrue),
where κ is a trade-off parameter. In the initial training phase, the model uses only classical loss
function applied to non-interval data (κ = 1). Next, the weight of the interval loss is gradually
increased up to κ = 1/2. Moreover, the training starts with the small perturbation radius , which is
also increased in later epochs. The training process is sensitive to these hyperparameters and finding
the correct schedule for every new data set can be problematic and requires extensive experimental
studies. This makes the whole training procedure time consuming, which reduces practicality of this
approach.
3.3 Constrained interval bound propagation
To make IBP less sensitive to the training settings and provide more training stability (particularly for
bigger ), we propose to enhance the cost function. We want to directly control the bounding boxes at
each layer of the network. More precisely, in addition to the IBP loss, we minimize the size of the
outer interval bound at each layer. Thus our cost function equals
constrainedIBP = κ`(zK , ytrue) + (1− κ)`(zˆk(), ytrue) +
K∑
k=1
‖zk − zk‖2.
We argue that such the addition would help to circumvent limitations of the original IBP. First,
gradients would be calculated not only with respect to the the last layer but to all hidden layers. This
should bring more training stability, especially at the early training stage. Second, we expect it would
be easier for a model to have small interval bounds in the final layer when bounds are constrained in
hidden layers. And indeed our experimental results support these research hypotheses.
4 Experiments
Here we report our experiments, which show the effect of the proposed loss function and give
some insight why it is beneficial to minimize the interval bounds in hidden layers. We implement
our ideas with PyTorch library Paszke et al. [2017] and for a fair comparison we reimplement the
original IBP using the same framework. We conduct the experiments on three datasets, namely
CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky et al., SVHN Netzer et al. [2011] and MNIST LeCun and Cortes. The neural
network architectures used in the experiments are the same as in Gowal et al. [2018] and these are
3 convolutional nets called small, medium and large, see Table 1 for details. In all experiments
adversarial perturbations are within `∞ norm-bounded ball. If not stated otherwise, we always apply
the original training procedure and hyper-parameters used in Gowal et al. [2018]. For CIFAR-10 and
SVHN, we use data augmentation (adding random translations and flips, normalizing each image
channel using the channel statistics from the training set).
4.1 Faster convergence
First, we highlight that our approach minimizes the verified test error much faster than IBP. Since
the performance of both methods on MNIST is comparable, we only report the results on most
challenging cases of CIFAR-10 and SVHN with maximal perturbation radius  = 8/255.
It is evident from Figure 3 that the difference between both methods is substantial. In the case of
CIFAR-10 after 100 epochs, the verified test error is over 20 percentage points lower, whereas the
nominal error is close. The shape of the curves for SVHN is similar, but the gain in verified accuracy
is slightly lower; after 50 epochs the verified error of constrainedIBP is also 20 percentage points
5
Table 1: Architectures used in the experiments. There are 4 parameters for the convolutional layer
(Conv2d): a number of input and output filters and a size of a filter and a stride. For the fully
connected layer the parameter denotes a number of outputs.
small medium large
Conv2d(input_filters, 16, 4, 2) Conv2d(input_filters, 32, 3, 1) Conv2d(input_filters, 64, 3, 1)
Conv2d(16, 32, 4, 1) Conv2d(32, 32, 4, 2) Conv2d(64, 64, 3, 1)
Fully_connected(100) Conv2d(32, 64, 3, 1) Conv2d(64, 128, 3, 2)
Fully_connected(10) Conv2d(64, 64, 4, 2) Conv2d(128, 128, 3, 1)
Fully_connected(512) Conv2d(128, 128, 3, 1)
Fully_connected(512) Fully_connected(200)
Fully_connected(10) Fully_connected(10)
Figure 3: Verifiably robust training for the CIFAR-10 (top row) and SVHN (botton row) with
adversarial perturbations bounded by  = 8/255. We report the verified test error, test error and the
average between these two metrics. Low nominal test errors are reached very quickly because the
training starts basically as the training of a regular classifier and and the robust term is introduced
gradually (as explained in Section 3).
lower than the one obtained by IBP, while after 100 epochs the difference is around 10 percentage
points.
We stress that we took the training schedule directly from the IBP method (in particular changes
in  and κ), which were tuned for that method. Selecting optimal parameters for constrainedIBP
opens the possibility for even better results and better trade-offs between the verified and the nominal
test errors. In the next section, we investigate the more dynamic  changes, which would make the
training even faster.
4.2 More stable training
Gowal et al. stated that their method needs to slowly increase  (from 0 to train) to provide stability
and convergence during the training. For example, for CIFAR-10, this ‘ramp-up’ phase lasts 150
epochs. It raises a natural question whether we could speed-up the  increase and whether our new
term in the loss function is helpful in this regard.
First we show that even if we keep the original  changes, IBP may stuck in a local minimum for a
very long time. The experiment was done on CIFAR-10 with the large architecture and  = 4/255.
The test error goes down very quickly, reaching 0.2, whereas the verified test error remains 100% for
over 100 epochs, see Figure 4. On the contrary, our approach steadily minimizes the verified test
error.
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Figure 4: Verifiably robust training for the CIFAR-10 dataset with adversarial perturbations bounded
by  = 4/255. Experiments done on the large architecture.
Figure 5: Verifiably robust training for the MNIST dataset with adversarial perturbations bounded by
 = 0.4. Experiments done on the small architecture. Perturbation radius  was increased 2.5 times
faster than in Gowal et al. [2018].
Next, we investigate the more dynamic  changes to reduce the training time. For the MNIST dataset,
increasing  2.5 faster results in lack of convergence for the original IBP method, see Figure 5. On
the other hand, the additional term in the loss function helps to stabilize the training and obtain the
minimization of verified error.
4.3 Minimizing interval bounds in hidden layers is desired
In our approach, we add the additional term to the loss function which helps to minimize the interval
bounds in hidden layers. Interestingly, the IBP method also tries to implicitly keep the interval bounds
stable in the hidden layers, see top row of Figure 6. In fact this is a natural behaviour, because it is
easier for a model to have small interval bounds in the final layer when bounds are possibly small in
hidden layers. Nevertheless, the additional term in our approach stabilizes bounds faster and their
values are a few orders of magnitude lower.
To gain more insight, we also checked what happens to the interval bounds during unstable training,
such as the one shown in Figure 5 for MNIST. It turns out that in such settings (more dynamic 
changes), the IBP method is unable to stabilize the interval bounds in hidden layers, see Figure 7.
This observation supports our hypothesis that verified error is highly correlated with the interval
bounds in the hidden layer. In consequence, it is beneficial to explicitly encourage the model to keep
the interval bounds low across layers.
4.4 Comparison with the original Interval Bound Propagation
For the sake of completeness we provide the comparison between IBP and our approach in terms
of final error rates. We report the test error, the error rate under the PGD attack and the verified
bound on the error rate. All these numbers are obtained after the complete training. We stress that
all hyperparameters (particularly schedules of , κ and learning rate) were left the same as in Gowal
et al. [2018].
It is evident from Table 2 that without any hyperparameters tuning, our approach gives comparable
results to IBP. However, the reported levels of errors are reached faster and the training is done in
more stable way — our main points described in the previous sections. We highlight the results for
CIFAR-10 with challenging  = 8/255, where our modification lets even the smallest model beat the
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Figure 6: Verifiably robust training for CIFAR-10 (left) and SVHN (right) with  = 8/255. We report
the total sum of mean squared errors between lower and upper interval bounds in hidden layers.
Figure 7: Verifiably robust training for MNIST with more dynamic  changes. We report the total
sum of mean squared errors between lower and upper interval bounds in hidden layers.
verified error obtained by Gowal et al for this dataset. For the largest network, we think the original
hyperparameters (number of epochs, learning rate schedule) cause overfitting for our method, i.e. the
model learns quickly and spends most of the training time on fitting to the train set.
5 Conclusion
Most techniques for training verifiably robust classifiers are computationally demanding. In this paper,
we used a simple but promising technique based on the interval arithmetic Gowal et al. [2018], which
needs only two standard network passes to process the input perturbed within the norm-bounded ball.
Although a single iteration can be performed fast, the whole training process requires careful tuning
and many epochs to converge. As a remedy, we proposed to additionally minimize the size of an
outer bound of the adversarial polytope across hidden layers. This modification was motivated by
the observation that IBP implicitly minimize these bounds in the case of the successful, convergent
training. By adding this constraint explicitly, the model become less sensitive to the change of
hyper-parameters and, in consequence, we could increase the perturbation radius more dynamically
to the desired value, which makes the training faster. As a result, we were able to obtain the lowest
verified error in the most challenging case of CIFAR-10 with the perturbation radius 8/255 using
only the small architecture.
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Dataset/model Epsilon Method Test error PGD Verified
Nominal 20.06% 95.76% 100%
CIFAR-10/small 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 39.33% 52.22% 63.58%
constrained-IBP 47.22% 56.14% 60.12%
Nominal 13.97% 89.59% 100%
CIFAR-10/medium 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 18.88% 48.32% 100%
constrained-IBP 49.29% 57.69% 61.81%
Nominal 12.95% 50.24% 100%
CIFAR-10/large 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 40.55% 56.65% 65.89%
constrained-IBP 52.04% 59.89% 63.89%
Nominal 0.65% 99.63% 100%
MNIST/small 0.4 IBP (Gowal et al.) 2.62% 14.14% 20.74%
constrained-IBP 7.24% 17.24% 21.31%
Nominal 1.06% 99.64% 100%
MNIST/medium 0.4 IBP (Gowal et al.) 1.66% 12.16% 17.5%
constrained-IBP 1.91% 9.7% 16.53%
Nominal 0.65% 99.64% 100%
MNIST/large 0.4 IBP (Gowal et al.) 1.66% 10.34% 15.01%
constrained-IBP 1.62% 8.32% 15.58%
Nominal 9.05% 82.05% 100%
SVHN/small 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 26.60% 48.50% 60.87%
constrained-IBP 36.10% 49.31% 53.97%
Nominal 5.84% 65.60% 100%
SVHN/medium 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 36.58% 48.79% 55.95%
constrained-IBP 21.55% 39.23% 54.32%
Nominal 5.78% 77.25% 100%
SVHN/large 8/255 IBP (Gowal et al.) 20.00% 37.06% 52.37%
constrained-IBP 42.62% 53.90% 59.16%
Table 2: Comparison between IBP by Gowal et al. and our modification. For the point of reference,
we also report numbers for the regular training (Nominal), without adversarial perturbations. The
PGD error rate is calculated using 200 iterations of PGD and 10 random restarts.
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